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Abstract	In	a	recent	paper,	Inmaculada	de	Melo-Martín	and	Kristen	Intemann	consider	several	ways	in	which,	from	the	perspective	of	the	argument	from	inductive	risk,	ethical	and	political	values	might	"sometimes	[be]	necessary	in	decisions	at	the	core	of	scientific	reasoning."	Specifically,	they	consider	whether	these	kinds	of	values	are	logically,	epistemically,	pragmatically,	or	ethically	necessary;	and	argue	that	there	are	significant	conceptual	problems	in	each	case.	In	this	comment,	using	regulatory	uses	of	high-throughput	toxicology	at	the	US	Environmental	Protection	Agency	[EPA]	as	a	case	study,	I	suggest	some	clarifications	and	corrections	to	some	of	their	claims	about	pragmatic	necessity.	I	conclude	that,	while	an	inductive	risk	framework	has	some	significant	limitations,	it	is	still	conceptually	and	rhetorically	valuable.	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	In	a	recent	paper	(de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	2016),	Inmaculada	de	Melo-Martín	and	Kristen	Intemann	consider	several	ways	in	which,	from	the	perspective	of	the	argument	from	inductive	risk,	ethical	and	political	values	might	"sometimes	[be]	necessary	in	decisions	at	the	core	of	scientific	reasoning,"	that	is,	in	the	"gathering	and	characterization	of	evidence	and/or	appraisal	and	acceptance	of	hypotheses"	(de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	2016,	501.	In	what	follows,	unheaded	citations	are	to	this	paper).	Specifically,	they	consider	whether	these	kinds	of	values	are	logically,	epistemically,	pragmatically,	or	ethically	necessary;	and	argue	that	there	are	significant	conceptual	problems	in	each	case.	In	this	comment,	I	focus	on	their	analysis	of	pragmatic	necessity.	Using	regulatory	uses	of	high-throughput	toxicology	at	 the	 US	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	 [EPA]	 as	 a	 case	 study,	 I	 suggest	 some	clarifications,	 elaborations,	 and	 corrections	 to	 some	 of	 their	 claims	 about	 pragmatic	necessity.	I	also	briefly	offer	a	general	critique	of	a	proposed	response	to	the	argument	from	inductive	risk,	made	independently	by	Wendy	Parker	and	Gregor	Betz	and	discussed	by	de	Melo-Martín	and	 Intemann.	 I	 conclude	 that,	while	an	 inductive	 risk	 framework	has	 some	significant	limitations,	it	is	still	conceptually	and	rhetorically	valuable.	The	argument	 from	 inductive	 risk	 is	 one	of	 the	major	 arguments	discussed	 in	 the	contemporary	 science	 and	 values	 literature.	 The	 argument	 is	 frequently	 associated	with	Heather	Douglas	 (2000;	 2009),	 but	 first	 received	 substantial	 discussion	 in	 the	 twentieth	century	by	Richard	Rudner	(1953)	and	Carl	Hempel	(1965),	and	has	been	supported	and	expanded	by	several	other	contemporary	philosophers	of	science	(Wilholt	2012;	Winsberg	2012;	Parker	2014;	Biddle	2016).	In	its	simplest	versions,	inductive	risk	arguments	claim,	first,	that	when	deciding	whether	or	not	to	accept	a	hypothesis	(data	source,	model,	etc.),	scientists	 should	 take	 into	 account	 the	 significance	 of	 making	 epistemic	 errors	 —	 the	significance	 of	 accepting	 bad	 data	 or	 an	 unreliable	model,	 or	 of	 rejecting	 good	 data	 or	 a	reliable	model.1	 Second,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 significance	 of	 making	 epistemic	 errors	requires	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 non-epistemic	 consequences	 of	 such	errors.	In	the	context	of	chemical	safety,	such	consequences	might	include	harming	human	health	and	the	environment,	or	the	economic	consequences	of	regulation	(Douglas	2000,	10–11).	Third,	 the	significance	of	non-epistemic	consequences	of	epistemic	error	depends	on	social	and	political	values.	Thus,	the	argument	concludes,	scientists	should	take	into	account	social	and	political	values	when	deciding	whether	or	not	to	accept	a	hypothesis.	This	might	mean,	for	example,	considering	the	non-epistemic	consequences	of	making	a	type	I	vs.	type																																																									
1	An	aphorism	in	statistics,	attributed	to	George	Box,	is	that	"all	models	are	wrong,	but	some	are	useful."	That	is,	all	statistical	models	depend	on	simplifications	and	assumptions,	and	it's	highly	plausible	that	at	least	some	of	these	are	strictly	false	in	any	given	case;	but,	despite	this,	some	models	can	still	be	useful	 for	producing	accurate	estimates	or	drawing	other	correct	inferences	about	the	target	population.	So	the	simplest	kind	of	inductive	risk	associated	with	accepting	a	model	is	not	the	risk	of	believing	its	false	assumptions,	but	rather	the	risk	of	using	a	model	 that	does	not	produce	accurate	estimates	or	 that	 leads	to	other	incorrect	inferences.	This	is	what	I	mean	by	"acceping	an	unreliable	model."	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	II	statistical	error,	and	using	these	considerations	to	select	acceptable	error	rates	(compare	Di	Stefano	2001;	Wahl	and	Ammann	2007,	40).	This	argument	challenges	the	ideal	of	value-free	science,	which	is	generally	defined	as	the	view	that	social	and	political	values	have	no	legitimate	role	to	play	in	the	"core"	stages	of	scientific	research,	such	as	gathering	evidence	and	accepting	or	rejecting	hypotheses.	In	their	analysis,	de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	argue	that	challenges	to	the	value-free	ideal	must	satisfy	what	they	call	the	necessity	condition:	Social	and	political	values	"are	at	 least	 sometimes	necessary	 in	decisions	at	 the	core	of	 scientific	 reasoning"	 (502).	They	consider,	and	challenge,	several	senses	of	"necessity"	according	to	which	an	inductive	risk	perspective	might	be	thought	to	satisfy	the	necessity	condition.	Due	to	limited	space,	here	I	focus	on	their	discussion	of	"pragmatic	necessity."	De	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	characterize	the	"pragmatic	necessity"	of	social	and	political	values	in	the	core	of	scientific	research	in	terms	of	"advancing	science	and	policy	aims"	(505).	In	regulatory	agencies	such	as	the	EPA,	science	is	done	not	(only)	for	its	own	sake	—	not	(only)	in	order	to	satisfy	researchers'	curiosity	or	discover	deep	truths	about	the	physical	world,	as	might	be	the	case	with	fields	such	as	cosmology	or	particle	physics	—	but	primarily	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 the	 agency's	mission	 of	 protecting	 human	 health	 and	 the	environment.	 Philosophers	 of	 science	 generally	 agree	 that	 values,	 such	 as	 the	 aim	 of	protecting	human	health	and	the	environment,	have	a	legitimate	role	to	play	in	formulating	research	 questions.	 At	 EPA,	 this	 is	 manifest	 in	 the	 mission	 of	 the	 Chemical	 Safety	 for	Sustainability	research	program,	which	is	developing	methods	to	produce	chemical	safety	data	thousands	of	times	faster	than	conventional	animal-based	methods	at	a	fraction	of	the	cost	and	without	requiring	the	use	of	animals	(US	Environmental	Protection	Agency	2015).	These	methods	are	known	as	"high-throughput	toxicology"	[HTT].	While	there	are	epistemic	concerns	about	HTT	—	I'll	discuss	this	more	below	—	EPA	believes	that	these	methods	have	the	 potential	 to	 address	 the	 fact	 that	we	 have	 no	 or	 limited	 data	 on	 the	 toxic	 effects	 of	thousands	of	widely-used	chemicals	(R.	Judson	et	al.	2009,	691,	table	3).	Without	these	data,	the	 agency	 argues,	 we	 simply	 have	 no	 way	 to	 make	 empirically	 informed	 regulatory	decisions	that	can	protect	human	health	and	the	environment.	In	other	words,	EPA's	decision	to	develop	HTT	methods	is	guided	explicitly	by	pragmatic	considerations	about	how	best	to	promote	the	agency's	mission.	But	a	decision	to	develop	HTT	methods	is	not	the	same	as	decisions	within	the	core	scientific	activity	of	developing	these	methods.	Given	that	these	methods	will	be	developed,	the	 goals	 of	 protecting	 human	 health	 and	 the	 environment	 might	 not	 be	 pragmatically	necessary	 for	 making	 decisions	 about	 how	 to	 gather	 and	 characterize	 data,	 or	 how	 to	evaluate	and	whether	to	accept	a	model.	In	other	words,	the	ideal	of	value-free	science	can	accept	the	use	of	social	and	political	values	to	choose	what	research	will	be	conducted;	but	rejects	any	role	for	these	values	within	the	research	process	itself.	By	contrast,	inductive	risk	arguments	are	arguments	that	social	and	political	values	have	a	legitimate	role	to	play	even	within	the	research	process	itself.	For	HTT,	this	would	mean	taking	into	account	(at	least)	that	 some	 epistemic	 errors	 will	 lead	 to	 detrimental	 effects	 on	 human	 health	 and	 the	environment	(due	to	underregulation);	others	will	lead	to	detrimental	economic	effects	(due	to	overregulation);	and	then	weighting	the	relative	significance	of	these	two	types	of	error	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	in	making	decisions	about	(among	other	things)	acceptable	error	rates.	Thus,	it	seems	that	inductive	risk	considerations	recommend	incorporating	social	and	political	values	into	the	core	of	HTT	research	in	order	to	promote	the	EPA's	mission;	and	in	this	sense	these	values	seem	to	be	pragmatically	necessary.	De	 Melo-Martín	 and	 Intemann	 offer	 two	 arguments	 against	 this	 picture	 of	 the	pragmatic	necessity	of	social	and	political	values	in	scientific	research.	First,	they	argue	that	"it	is	not	obvious	what	would	distinguish	this	position	from	the	[value-free	ideal],"	because	"it	 no	 longer	 appears	 that	 [social	 and	 political	 values]	 are	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 the	 core	 of	scientific	reasoning,	but	rather	in	decisions	about	which	models,	methodologies,	or	research	strategies	to	pursue	solely	for	the	aim	of	continuing	research	or	policy	advising"	(506).	But	this	argument	simply	seems	to	miss	the	possibility	sketched	in	the	previous	paragraph,	on	which	social	and	political	values	play	a	role	within	the	core	scientific	activity	of	developing	HTT	methods,	and	not	only	in	the	decision	to	develop	these	methods.	Decisions	about	what	error	rates	are	acceptable	are	certainly	within	the	core	of	scientific	reasoning.	Following	Mitchell	 (2004),	 it	might	 be	 argued	 that	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	scientists	 acting	 "as	 policy	 advisors"	 and	 as	 "produc[ers]	 of	 knowledge"	 (506).	 But	 the	explicit	point	of	HTT	research	is	to	produce	knowledge	for	the	sake	of	advising	policy.	While	Mitchell's	distinction	might	be	relevant	to	other	cases	(e.g.,	an	astrophysicist	who	becomes	Director	of	 the	National	 Science	Foundation,	 and	 so	whose	 research	does	not	 inform	 the	policy	decisions	that	she	makes),	it	does	not	seem	to	apply	to	HTT	researchers.	Similarly,	one	might	appeal	to	a	distinction	between	belief	and	acceptance,	according	to	which	"whether	a	proposition	is	worthy	of	belief	varies	only	on	the	amount	of	evidence	available	and	is	not	based	on	other	contextual	factors	because	belief	is	always	focused	on	arriving	at	truth,"	while	a	claim	might	be	accepted	(among	other	possible	reasons)	"because	it	serves	as	the	best	basis	for	 formulating	 a	 particular	 regulatory	 policy"	 (Elliott	 and	Willmes	 2013,	 811).	 But	HTT	researchers	are	focused	on	both	arriving	at	truth	(or,	with	respect	to	inductive	risk,	avoiding	error)	and	informing	regulatory	policymaking.	Indeed,	truth	is	valuable	because	and	insofar	as	it	provides	the	best	basis	for	regulatory	policy.	More	generally,	we	cannot	cleanly	separate	the	 epistemic	 and	 pragmatic	 aspects	 of	 HTT	 research	—	 whether	 in	 terms	 of	 different	research	stages,	different	social	roles,	or	different	cognitive	attitudes	—	not	only	because	HTT	research	has	both	epistemic	and	pragmatic	aims,	but	 further	because	 the	pragmatic	success	 of	 HTT	 research	 requires	 its	 epistemic	 success,	 and	 vice	 versa.	 Inductive	 risk	arguments	make	this	connection	between	pragmatic	and	epistemic	concrete,	in	terms	of	the	downstream	social	consequences	of	epistemic	error.		De	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann's	second	argument	is	that	"when	uncertainties	exist,	rather	 than	using	contextual	value	 judgments	 to	provide	policy	advising,	 scientists	might	instead	 utilize	 a	 plurality	 of	 alternative	 models,	 ranges	 of	 observational	 values,	 or	parameters	of	statistical	significance"	(506-7).	Here	de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	borrow	(without	 endorsing)	 proposals	 from	 Parker	 (2010)	 and	 Betz	 (2013).	 To	 develop,	 and	ultimately	 respond	 to,	 this	 proposal,	 I	 will	 consider	 a	 particular	 technical-regulatory	controversy	involving	EPA's	HTT	research.	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	In	June	2015,	EPA's	Endocrine	Disruptor	Screening	Program	[EDSP]	announced	that	they	would	 begin	 to	 accept	 a	 particular	HTT	model	—	 the	 "ER	Model"	—	 for	 regulatory	purposes	(Environmental	Protection	Agency	2015).2	This	decision	was	based	on	a	series	of	scientific	 publications	 by	 a	 collaboration	 of	 researchers	 and	 regulators	 at	 EPA	 and	 the	National	 Institute	 of	 Environmental	 Health	 Sciences	 [NIEHS],	 which	 argued	 that	 the	 ER	Model	could	reproduce	the	results	of	conventional	(i.e.,	non-HTT)	"guideline-like"	tests	with	a	low	false	negative	rate	of	10.9%,	i.e.,	a	10.9%	chance	of	arriving	at	an	erroneous	conclusion	that	a	chemical	is	not	estrogenic	when	in	fact	it	 is	(Kleinstreuer	et	al.	2015;	Browne	et	al.	2015;	R.	Judson	et	al.	2015).	In	 public	 comments	 on	 the	 EDSP	 announcement,	 the	 Natural	 Resources	 Defense	Council	[NRDC],	an	environmental	advocacy	organization,	argued	that	the	ER	Model	had	an	unacceptably	high	false	negative	rate	of	30.9%	(Pullen	2015).	This,	of	course,	is	much	higher	than	the	false	negative	rate	calculated	by	the	EPA-NIEHS	collaboration.	The	disparity	is	due	to	different	ways	of	handling	11	(out	of	55	total)	"inconclusive"	chemicals	that	had	low	but	non-zero	scores	in	the	ER	Model.	See	table	1.	The	EPA-NIEHS	collaboration	counted	these	chemicals	 as	 "hits,"	 that	 is,	 interpreted	 these	 chemicals	 as	 being	 estrogenic,	 and	 thereby	counted	them	as	true	positives.	NRDC,	on	the	other	hand,	counted	these	same	chemicals	as	"no-hits,"	 that	 is,	assumed	that	 they	would	be	 interpreted	as	non-estrogenic,	and	thereby	counted	them	as	false	negatives.	More	precisely,	the	ER	Model	generates	"scores"	for	chemicals,	generally	between	0	(no	 activity	 in	 any	 of	 the	 HTT	 assays)	 and	 1	 (the	 same	 level	 of	 activity	 as	 a	 reference	estrogen).	Browne	et	al.	(2015)	truncated	scores	below	. 001	to	0,	on	the	grounds	that	a	score	of	 .001	 corresponds	 to	 estrogenic	 activity	 only	 at	 a	 concentration	 "several	 orders	 of	magnitude	 greater	 than	 the	 highest	 concentrations	 tested"	 (Browne	 et	 al.	 2015,	 8806);	chemicals	in	this	range	are	counted	as	negatives.	(Note	that	low	scores	correspond	to	activity	only	at	high	concentrations,	that	is,	low	potency.)	Chemicals	with	scores	greater	than	or	equal	to	 . 1	 are	 counted	 as	 positives.	 The	 inconclusive	 chemicals	 are	 those	 with	 scores	 in	 the	interval	 [.001, .1).	 Scores	 in	 this	 range	 indicate	 "limited	 activity	 and	 low	 potency"	 with																																																									
2	 Briefly,	 EDSP's	mission	 is	 to	 screen	 chemicals	 as	 potential	 endocrine	disruptors.	EDSP	uses	a	two-tier	approach,	where	Tier	1	involves	a	relatively	fast,	inexpensive,	but	less	reliable	set	of	tests;	chemicals	that	are	judged	to	be	potential	endocrine	disruptors	based	on	Tier	1	are	then	sent	on	to	Tier	2	for	more	rigorous	scrutiny.	Tier	1	involves	several	different	subsets	 of	 tests,	 designed	 to	 check	 whether	 chemicals	 interact	 with	 distinct	 endocrine	subsystems	—	whether	 they're	 estrogen	mimics	 or	 testosterone	 inhibitors,	 for	 example.	According	to	a	chemical	industry	estimate,	the	established	set	of	Tier	1	tests,	despite	being	fast	and	inexpensive	relative	to	Tier	2,	still	cost	on	the	order	of	one	million	dollars	and	take	three	years	(Becker	and	Tipaldo	2013).	The	July	2015	announcement	was	that	the	ER	Model	—	a	HTT	model	of	the	intracellular	estrogen	activity	pathway	—	could	be	used	in	place	of	three	Tier	1	tests.	The	tests	required	for	this	HTT	model	can	be	conducted	much	faster	and	less	expensively	than	the	conventional	tests,	and	do	not	use	animals.	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	"questionable	relevance	to	in	vivo	bioactivity"	(Browne	et	al.	2015,	8806).	In	other	words,	chemicals	with	ER	Model	scores	in	the	inconclusive	range	appear	to	have	a	non-zero	but	low	level	of	estrogenic	activity.	These	scores	are	not	inconclusive	because	of	limited	accuracy	or	precision,	but	instead	because	it	is	not	clear	whether	these	low	levels	of	estrogenic	activity	are	large	enough	to	be	concerning.	Because	their	scores	are	non-zero,	there	is	some	reason	to	think	that	they	are	estrogenically	active;	but	because	their	scores	are	low,	there	is	some	reason	 to	 think	 that	 this	 activity	 only	 takes	 place	 when	 someone	 is	 exposed	 to	 these	chemicals	in	large	quantities.	Exposure	estimates	might	determine	that	95%	of	people	will	never	be	exposed	to	a	given	low-potency	chemical	in	such	large	quantities	(Wetmore	et	al.	2012);	but	in	the	US	this	still	indicates	that	tens	of	millions	of	people	might	be	exposed	to	large	quantities	of	the	chemical,	and	cumulative	exposures	to	many	low-potency	chemicals	might	have	effects	similar	to	(or	even	greater	than)	exposures	to	high-potency	chemicals.	
Table	1.	Three	ways	of	calculating	False	Negative	Rates	[FNRs]	in	two	sets	of	reference	
chemicals	in	Browne	et	al.	(2015).			 in	vitro	 GL	uterotrophic	#	true	positive	 25	 38	#	inconclusive	 1	 11	#	false	negative	 2	 6	total	w/o	inconclusives	 27	 44	total	w/	inconclusives	 28	 55	FNR	w/o	inconclusives	 2/27	(7.4%)	 6/44	(13.6%)	FNR	(Browne	et	al.	2015)	 2/28	(7.1%)	 6/55	(10.9%)	FNR	(NRDC)	 3/28	(10.7%)	 17/55	(30.9%)		 	 	
"Inconclusive"	 chemicals	had	ER	Model	 scores	 in	 the	 interval	 [.001, .1);	 scores	below	. 001	were	truncated	to	0	and	counted	as	negatives,	and	scores	greater	than	or	equal	to	. 1	were	
counted	as	positives	(Browne	et	al.	2015,	8806).	The	first	FNR	calculation	ignores	inconclusives	
completely.	 The	 second,	 used	 throughout	 Browne	 et	 al.	 (2015),	 interprets	 inconclusives	 as	
positives,	thereby	counting	them	as	true	positives.	The	third,	used	in	the	NRDC	comments	on	the	
EDSP	Pivot,	interprets	inconclusives	as	negatives,	thereby	counting	them	as	false	negatives.	All	
chemicals	 used	 for	 these	 calculations	were	 considered	 active	 based	 on	 a	 curated	 literature	
search	(Kleinstreuer	et	al.	2015).	I	want	to	make	six	points	about	this	disparity	between	EPA-NIEHS	and	NRDC.	First,	there	 is	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 false	 negative	 rate	 for	 the	 ER	 Model.	 This	uncertainty	carries	inductive	risk,	since	the	false	negative	rate	estimates	the	reliability	of	the	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	ER	Model	for	determining	whether	chemicals	are	estrogenic.	But,	second,	this	uncertainty	is	not	due	to	limitations	in	the	available	evidence;	instead,	it	is	due	to	the	need	to	make	what	Eric	Winsberg	calls	"unforced	methodological	choices"	(2012)	about	the	range	of	activity	and	potency	values	that	should	be	considered	"relevant,"	that	is,	concerning.	More	accuracy	or	precision	 in	 the	 estimation	 of	 ER	Model	 scores	 will	 not	 tell	 us	 what	 level	 of	 potency	 is	sufficient	to	give	us	a	reason	to	be	concerned	about	a	potential	hazard.	What's	inconclusive	about	an	inconclusive	score	is	not	the	score	itself,	but	rather	its	significance	as	a	reason	for	regulatory	action.	Third,	decisions	about	how	to	interpret	inconclusive	chemicals	—	the	decision	about	how	 to	 calculate	 the	FNR	—	may	have	 substantial	downstream	consequences	 for	human	health	and	the	environment.	NRDC's	calculation	is	much	more	pessimistic	about	how	the	ER	Model	will	be	 interpreted;	and	so	 it	 is	highly	plausible	 that	 their	calculations	are	directly	motivated	by	their	concern	to	protect	human	health	and	the	environment.	But	EPA-NIEHS's	interpretation	of	inconclusive	chemicals	—	which	treats	them	all	as	positives	—	if	adopted	into	policy,	would	be	much	more	protective	of	these	values	than	the	interpretation	assumed	by	 NRDC.	 More	 generally,	 any	 way	 of	 calculating	 the	 false	 negative	 rate	 will	 have	 non-epistemic	consequences	for	human	health	and	the	environment,	whether	or	not	these	values	play	an	explicit	role	in	the	decision	to	adopt	one	method	or	another.	Fourth,	 the	 second	 and	 third	 points	 together	 mean	 that	 this	 case	 provides	 an	important	 counterexample	 or	 exception	 to	 Douglas'	 claim	 that	 "More	 evidence	 usually	makes	values	less	important	...,	as	uncertainty	reduces"	(Douglas	2009,	96).	The	uncertainty	here	 is	 not	 a	 result	 of	 limited	 evidence;	 additional	 evidence	 (of	 the	 kind	used	 by	 the	ER	Model)	 would	 simply	 improve	 the	 precision	 and	 accuracy	 of	 the	 measurements	 of	 the	chemicals'	 low	 potency.	 But	 again,	 these	 scores	 are	 not	 inconclusive	 because	 of	 limited	accuracy	or	precision,	but	 instead	because	 it's	not	obvious	what	 range	of	potency	values	should	trigger	regulation.	For	instance,	additional	evidence	that	refines	an	ER	Model	score,	say,	from	.01	to	.00738	does	not	tell	us	whether	scores	in	the	interval	[.001, .1)	should	be	interpreted	 as	 potentially	 hazardous.3	 The	 values	 of	 protecting	 human	 health	 and	 the	environment	are	needed	to	settle	this	indeterminacy;	that	is,	these	values	are	pragmatically	
																																																								
3	Other	kinds	of	studies	might	be	used	to	narrow	the	range	of	inconclusive	scores.	For	instance,	exposure	studies	might	be	used	to	estimate	the	number	of	people	who	might	be	exposed	to	a	given	chemical	beyond	the	level	indicated	by	the	ER	Model	score	(Wetmore	et	al.	 2012;	 Isaacs	 et	 al.	 2016).	 However,	 such	 studies	 are	 themselves	 extremely	 complex	research	projects,	which	involve	their	own	unforced	methodological	choices	—	about	whom	to	survey	and	how,	for	instance	—	and	raise	their	own	inductive	risk	concerns	—	such	as	the	possibility	 of	 over-	 or	 underestimating	 exposure.	 Thus,	 such	 studies	 have	 their	 own	uncertainties,	and	combining	them	with	the	ER	Model	might,	as	it	were,	increase	rather	than	decrease	overall	uncertainty	(Sarewitz	2004).	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	necessary.	 (I	 do	 not	 consider	 here	whether	 this	 one	 example	 is	 enough	 to	 challenge	 the	"usually"	in	Douglas'	claim.)	Fifth,	in	line	with	the	proposal	that	de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	borrow	from	Parker	and	Betz,	the	EPA-NIEHS	collaboration	could	have	included	multiple	different	false	negative	rate	calculations	in	their	analysis.	Indeed,	they	did	exactly	this,	considering	several	different	sets	 of	 reference	 chemicals,	 several	 different	 accuracy	 statistics,	 and	making	 calculations	with	and	without	the	inconclusive	chemicals	(Browne	et	al.	2015,	8808,	table	4).	However,	they	did	not	include	the	particular	calculation	used	by	NRDC,	primarily	because	it	simply	did	not	occur	to	them	to	do	so;	that	is,	it	simply	did	not	occur	to	them	that	inconclusive	chemicals	might	be	treated	as	false	negatives.	This	interpretation	of	inconclusive	chemicals	was	first	suggested	by	NRDC,	and	there	was	no	reason	why	the	EPA-NIEHS	collaboration	should	have	considered	the	possibility	beforehand.	Finally,	in	light	of	the	preceding	observations,	I	argue	that	the	Parker/Betz	proposal	does	 not	 eliminate	 the	 pragmatic	 necessity	 for	 social	 and	 political	 values	 in	 the	 core	 of	scientific	reasoning.	Taken	in	a	very	strong	sense,	the	proposal	would	require	that	scientists	anticipate	and	conduct	numerous	alternative	analyses.	But,	from	the	perspective	of	both	EPA	and	NRDC,	 such	 a	 requirement	would	 indefinitely	 slow	 analysis	 and	 so	 delay	 regulation,	which	conflicts	with	 the	pragmatic	aim	of	protecting	human	health	and	the	environment.	Even	if	the	proposal	were	understood	more	modestly	—	say,	as	a	requirement	that	scientists	anticipate	 and	 conduct	 multiple	 analyses	 that	 cover	 a	 range	 of	 "reasonable"	 values	 and	interests	—	it	could	still	be	quite	demanding,	leading	to	pragmatic	conflict	with	the	mission	of	protecting	human	health	and	the	environment	that	both	EPA	and	NRDC	share.	Simply	put,	the	 more	 analyses	 that	 EPA	 must	 conduct,	 the	 longer	 protective	 regulation	 is	 delayed.	Following	 a	 recent	 suggestion	 from	 Steel	 (2016),	 this	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 an	epistemic	error	with	potential	harmful	downstream	consequences,	 that	 is,	 inductive	risk;	specifically,	 a	 stubborn	 withholding	 of	 acceptance/belief	 that	 potentially	 leads	 to	preventable	harm	to	human	health	or	the	environment.	Further,	even	the	modest	version	of	the	Parker/Betz	proposal	depends	on	judgments	about	which	values	and	interests	are	"reasonable."	Inductive	risk	arguments	can	be	applied	to	these	judgments	themselves,	insofar	as	they	are	generalizations	about	the	range	of	views	and	 interests	 held	 by	 reasonable	 people.	 For	 consistency,	 the	 proposal	 would	 seem	 to	require	also	working	with	a	range	of	potential	judgments	about	what	counts	as	"reasonable,"	which	in	turn	would	depend	on	judgments	about	the	range	of	reasonable	criteria	for	judging	reasonableness,	and	so	on.	All	together	and	in	general,	the	Parker/Betz	proposal	requires	at	least	two	unforced	methodological	choices,	regarding	the	number	of	alternative	analyses	to	conduct	and	which	alternative	 assumptions,	 methods,	 etc.,	 to	 use	 in	 these	 analyses.	 These	 choices	 involve	tradeoffs	between	breadth	of	coverage	and	other,	social	or	political	values	(such	as	timely	response	to	threats	to	human	health	and	the	environment),	as	well	as	judgments	about	which	assumptions	 are	 "reasonable."	 Since	 both	 factors	 depend	 on	 social	 and	 political	 values,	adopting	the	Parker/Betz	proposal	requires	making	decisions	within	the	core	of	scientific	reasoning	that	depend	on	social	and	political	values.	That	is,	social	and	political	values	are	
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Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	pragmatically	necessary	for	the	Parker/Betz	proposal.	Thus,	inductive	risk	considerations	show	that	the	Parker/Betz	proposal	is	not	a	viable	defense	of	the	value-free	ideal.	The	preceding	criticisms	of	de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann's	discussion	of	"pragmatic	necessity"	do	not	mean	that	I	think	that	inductive	risk	considerations	exhaust	the	range	of	legitimate	influences	for	social	and	political	values	in	science.	Indeed,	my	own	full	position	is	quite	similar	 to	 their	 "aims	approach,"	according	 to	which	"social,	 ethical,	and	political	value	judgments	are	legitimate	in	scientific	decisions	insofar	as	they	promote	democratically	endorsed	epistemological	and	social	aims	of	the	research"	(516-7),	and	like	them	I	am	critical	of	Douglas'	direct/indirect	role	distinction	(509-10).	In	particular,	I	agree	with	Intemann	and	de	Melo-Martín	(personal	communication)	that,	when	the	aims	of	protecting	human	health	and	the	environment	are	used	as	a	reason	to	adopt	a	certain	method	of	calculating	the	false	negative	rate	(accepting	claims	that	this	method	is	reliable	and	so	on),	this	appears	to	be	a	direct	use	of	values	in	the	core	of	scientific	inquiry.	However,	while	inductive	risk	considerations	have	their	limitations,	I	find	that	they	are	still	useful	both	analytically	—	as	in	my	analysis	of	the	disagreement	between	EPA	and	NRDC	—	and	rhetorically	—	as	a	basic	challenge	to	the	value-free	ideal	for	an	audience	of	nonspecialists.	 Specifically,	 the	notion	of	 "pragmatic	necessity"	 is	useful	 for	clarifying	 the	relationship	between	 the	epistemic	and	social	and	political	aims	of	 scientific	 research:	 In	many	cases,	such	as	at	EPA,	we	pursue	some	epistemic	aims	for	the	sake	of	some	other,	social	or	political	aims.	In	these	cases,	social	and	political	aims	appropriately	regulate	how	and	in	what	ways	we	pursue	knowledge	(compare	Richardson	2002,	101):	the	EPA	should	use	a	false	negative	 rate	 calculation	 that	works	 to	protect	 human	health	 and	 the	 environment.	Many	portrayals	of	wishful	thinking	and	politicized	science	portray	epistemic	and	social	and	political	 aims	as	essentially	 antagonistic,	 but	 "pragmatic	necessity"	 lets	us	 recognize	 that	often	the	pursuit	of	truth	is	properly	informed	by	its	utility	for	promoting	further	social	and	political	ends.	Pragmatic	necessity	does	not	seem	to	have	the	conceptual	problems	that	de	Melo-Martín	and	Intemann	claim;	so	in	this	sense	of	necessity	an	inductive	risk	framework	can	hold	that	social	and	political	values	are	necessary	even	in	the	core	of	scientific	inquiry;	and	so	an	inductive	risk	framework	can	satisfy	the	necessity	condition	and	reject	the	value-free	ideal.	
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